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4 ‘A hundred flowers bloom’
The re-emergence of the Chinese
press in post-Suharto Indonesia1
Chang-yau Hoon
During the whole 32 years of Suharto’s regime (1966–98), Chinese publi-
cations and the use of Chinese language in public were officially banned in
Indonesia. As a result, printed matter in Chinese characters that entered
Indonesia was classified as ‘prohibited imports’ (Heryanto 1999: 327). This
prohibition came to an end after the fall of Suharto, as part of the process
of democratization and Reformasi. The post-Suharto era of Reformasi is thus
celebrated for the dramatic revival of the freedom of the press and media
in Indonesia and many previously banned as well as new publications have
emerged since Suharto’s fall. The Chinese press and media joined this flores-
cence and many new Chinese-language daily newspapers and magazines
soon appeared. A local Chinese media expert describes this period as ‘the
time when a hundred flowers bloom (baihua qifang)’ (Li, Z. H. 2003: 323).
Juxtaposing the Chinese press in the pre-Suharto era with its current scene,
it is possible to identify both continuity and discontinuity from the earlier
Chinese press. On the one hand, most post-Suharto Chinese presses are oper-
ated by media practitioners who worked in this field during the pre-Suharto
era. These people belong to an older generation and are mostly over 55 years
of age. Their influence on the contemporary Chinese media has manifested
itself in a focus on nostalgia and traditional Chinese culture. Notably, the
Chinese press has become a ‘space’ for these people, who had been silenced
over the three previous decades, to speak out and socialize. However, it is
unfortunate that the significance of the differences in experience, education
and language background between the older generation of media practitioners
and the potential younger generation of readers has resulted in a limited
readership among the younger generation.
On the other hand, whereas the Chinese press in the past spoke to readers
as huaqiao, or ‘overseas Chinese’, the contemporary Chinese press is an
ethnic press that seeks to address its audience as huaren, or ‘ethnic Chinese’,
with multiple identities. Before the Second World War, many Chinese in
Indonesia were indeed predominantly huaqiao in identity. In Suryadinata’s
term, ‘they were sojourners rather than settlers’ who intended to return to
their homeland (2001: 55). However, Indonesian nationalism and inde-
pendence have transformed most huaqiao to huaren with local identities, 
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as the majority of the Chinese population have become Indonesian citizens
and are no longer sojourners who plan to return to their ancestral land.2
This is not to say that they can ignore the ‘China factor’ (Sun, Introduc-
tion in this volume). In fact, as this chapter demonstrates, there is a general
obsession with China in the local Chinese press, whether deliberate or 
not. This transnational or diasporic imagination is motivated not only by
globalization of cultural products but also by the growing significance of 
the Chinese economy. The negotiations between the Indonesian-language
Chinese press and the Chinese-language press, older-generation media prac-
titioners and younger-generation readers, the global and the local, politics
and culture, and Chinese and Indonesian identities constitute the core of 
this chapter.
The aim here is to map the re-emergence of the Chinese press after its
disappearance from Indonesia’s public space. I shall commence with a brief
historical overview of the Chinese press in Indonesia and then explore issues
related to representations of ‘Chineseness’ through an analysis of several
Chinese newspapers and magazines that re-emerged after 1998. The inten-
tion of this chapter is not simply to document the evolution of the Chinese
press in Indonesia. Rather, it sets out to unpack the complex meaning of the
‘Chinese press’ and ‘Chineseness’ in Indonesia and, this, of course, cannot
be understood without some knowledge of the historical background. The
focus of this chapter, however, is about how, in many ways, Chinese ident-
ities in Indonesia are negotiated and reflected through the development of
the local Chinese press at different historical junctures. These negotiations
first took place between the totok (China-born, ‘pure’ blood) and peranakan
(local-born or mixed blood) Chinese identities during the colonial era; then
between huaqiao and newly ‘imagined’ Indonesian (huaren) identities during
the early Independence period, when political and ideological competition
had reached its climax in Indonesia.
It would have been impossible for today’s audience to understand the
depth and complexity of the identity contestation during the above periods
without the extensive documentations in the Chinese press during that era.
The prohibition of Chinese publications during Suharto’s era did not com-
pletely discontinue the tensions and negotiations between totok, peranakan,
huaqiao and huaren identities. But, due to the closure of the Chinese media,
these negotiations have not been adequately documented. As a result,
scholars could not but generalize that the Chinese during Suharto’s regime
had been systematically ‘Indonesianized’, as if there were no identity politics
or agency involved.
Defining the Chinese press in Indonesia
In order to understand the nature of the Chinese press, it is crucial to first
understand the heterogeneity of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Far from
being a culturally homogeneous group, the Chinese are heterogeneous and
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can be grouped differently in different periods. However, conventionally,
they have been divided by scholars into two main parts, the China-oriented
totok and the acculturated peranakan.3 Chinese-Indonesians before Indo-
nesia’s Independence accepted this identity and ontological distinction. The
peranakan have resided in Indonesia for centuries but this does not mean
that they had fully assimilated into the native population (Williams 1960:
13). Colonial ethnic policies, religion, economic position and the Chinese
sense of cultural superiority were the main obstacles to complete assimila-
tion (Amyot 1972: 49).4 Many of these people intermarried with the locals,
adopted local culture and lost many features of their ‘Chineseness’. The
peranakan spoke one of the Indonesian languages or a type of Chinese-
Malay language and, although the Chinese-Malay language was regarded as
‘low Malay’, it has become an integral part of Indonesian literary history
and linguistics.5
Coming from different parts of China and speaking different Chinese
dialects, the totok arrived in Indonesia at the end of the nineteenth and begin-
ning of the twentieth century. This wave of migration included a significant
number of women, which meant that Chinese men could take a China-born
wife rather than a native wife or peranakan (Mackie and Coppel 1976: 8).
During the colonial times until the early period of Indonesia’s Inde-
pendence, the term ‘Chinese press’ referred to publications in the Chinese-
Malay language (also known as the peranakan press) as well as those
published in Chinese language. In fact, the peranakan press first emerged
in the archipelago in the early 1900s, that is, a decade before the first Chinese-
language press was published. The emergence of the peranakan press was
inspired by the rise of pan-Chinese nationalism at the end of the nineteenth
century. The peranakan press experienced a reawakened sense of Chinese
identity whereby the Chinese people were attempting to rediscover their
roots by demanding ‘Chinese stories or something about China and about
themselves in a language that they were familiar with’ (Suryadinata 1978:
131). Chinese-language newspapers were published in conjunction with the
growing Chinese-speaking totok community.
From the emergence of the first peranakan newspaper up to the Japanese
Occupation, there were at least 45 peranakan newspapers and seven Chinese-
language newspapers published in Indonesia (Pandiangan 2003). Almost 
half of the peranakan press appeared in the 1920s. During the 1920s and
early 1930s, there were three different political streams within the peranakan
community that were represented by three major newspapers: Sin Po, Siang
Po and Sin Tit Po. Sin Po promoted Chinese nationalism and anti-Dutch
colonialism and represented the orientation of both China-oriented totok
and peranakan. Siang Po was pro-Dutch colonial government and repre-
sented the interests of the upper-class pro-Dutch Chinese business
organizations. Sin Jit Po, which changed its name to Sin Tit Po in 1929,
promoted Indonesian nationalism among peranakan Chinese (Suryadinata
1978: 134; Li, Z. H. 2003: 84). The peranakan press during the Dutch
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colonial era was characterized not by their business interests but by their
engagement with idealism and political orientations. As Pandiangan (2003:
408) describes, ‘[t]he peranakan Chinese press did not simply report events;
it opened up a space for a dialogue’. Hence, this press was an extremely
powerful instrument that not only documented what was happening but
actively engaged in the construction of discourses and the development of
the Chinese society in that period. In fact, most of the famous peranakan
Chinese figures who fought for the rights and shaped the national identity
of the Chinese, and joined hands with Indonesia’s nationalists to struggle
for the nation’s Independence, had a prominent role in the press.
However, Suryadinata (1978: 32) notes that, after the closure of Chinese
schools and the Chinese press in 1966, most Chinese were ‘Indonesianized’
as they were forced to enrol in Indonesian-medium schools. Hence, it can
be said that most Chinese who are below 50 years of age no longer read or
write Chinese. This also implies a breakdown of the dichotomy between
totok and peranakan. The Chinese in the post-Suharto era tend to identify
themselves as Chinese-Indonesians since the terms totok and peranakan can
no longer represent the heterogeneity of Chinese identity.6 Furthermore,
standard Bahasa Indonesia rather than Chinese-Malay language is used in
the Indonesian-language Chinese press. Hence, the section on the ‘post-
Suharto era’ uses the ‘Indonesian-language Chinese press’ to refer to the
post-Suharto Chinese press published in Bahasa Indonesia and ‘Chinese-
language press’ to refer to that which is published in Chinese. The term
‘Chinese press’ is used, loosely, throughout this chapter to describe both the
Indonesian-language press and the Chinese-language press in Indonesia.
Sin Po and the history of the Chinese press
‘Older generation Indonesians, be they natives or Chinese, none of them
have not heard of Sin Po’ (Li, Z. H. 2003: 1; my translation). Sin Po was
a weekly peranakan newspaper that was established by young peranakan
Chinese in Jakarta on 1 October 1910. Sin Po became a daily newspaper in
1912 to meet rising demand and soon became one of the largest Malay news-
papers in the Dutch East Indies (Li, Z. H. 2003: 2). The political objective
of Sin Po was to promote Chinese nationalism. It positioned itself in oppo-
sition to Siang Po and took a strong stance against Dutch colonialism (see
Li, Z. H. 2003: 1). Sin Po also shared the vision of Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan
(the Chinese Organization), the first pan-Chinese organization founded in
Jakarta in 1900, to resinicize the peranakan by fostering Chinese education
and culture.7 It published articles critiquing ‘corrupt’ Chinese customs and
traditions practised by the peranakan Chinese, as well as articles on classical
Chinese literature such as Sam Kok (The Romance of the Three Kingdoms)
(see Suryadinata 2002: 53 and Li, Z. H. 2003: 2).
Sin Po first published its Chinese version (Xin Bao) in February 1921.
Suryadinata (1978: 137) argues that Xin Bao was probably the first Chinese-
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language daily in Indonesia. The number of Chinese-language newspapers
rose rapidly after 1920. It has been noted that the Chinese-language press
took a more vigorous stance against the Japanese than their peranakan coun-
terparts (Suryadinata 1978: 138). Xin Bao actively promoted anti-Japanese
propaganda and mobilized the overseas Chinese to raise funds to support
the war against the Japanese invasion of China (Li, Z. H. 2003: 10–11).
During the Japanese Occupation, all Chinese-language and most pera-
nakan newspapers were closed down and many Chinese journalists were put
in concentration camps because of their anti-Japanese sentiments. The excep-
tions were Matahari and Hong Po, whose sympathies were with the Japanese,
despite protests from Chinese communities (Suryadinata 1978: 134;
Pandiangan 2003: 407, 409).
After the war and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China,
Chinese-language newspapers were polarized into pro-Beijing and pro-
Taiwan camps. Xin Bao and Shenghuo Bao belonged to the former camp,
while Tiansheng Ribao and Zhonghua Shangbao represented the voice of
the Guomindang and were robustly anti-Communist. These newspapers’
different political orientations often involved them in a ‘war of words’ (Li,
Z. H. 2003: 19).8 Xin Bao mainly reported news related to the building of
the new China and of Chinese societies in Indonesia. It still strongly iden-
tified itself as a huaqiao (sojourner) press and encouraged the local Chinese
to unite and show their support for China. In the cultural sphere, Xin Bao
still actively promoted Chinese culture and education, especially through the
supplementary section (fu kan) of its newspaper (Li, Z. H. 2003: 19).
The supplementary section of the Chinese press played a crucial role in
the development of language and culture. It provided a space for writers to
contribute their articles or stories. These writings often represented the
discourses that were dominant in the society at that time. Many Chinese
who later became important figures in politics and literature in Indonesia
were contributors to either the Chinese or Indonesian version of Sin Po and
other Chinese newspapers.
Sin Po contributed significantly to shaping what is today referred to as
Bahasa Indonesia. Many Chinese (mostly Hokkien, a dialect in Chinese)
words – most of which are related to food – have become an integral part
of the Indonesian language. And many of these words that are used in
everyday Indonesian language, such as teh (tea), kecap (soy sauce), juhi
(cuttlefish), kue (cakes), tahu (tofu) and soto (meat soup), have their origin
in a Chinese dialect (see Li, Z. H. 2003: 26).
The ideological struggles between right-wing and left-wing Chinese-
language newspapers continued until February 1958, when a regional
rebellion took place in central Sumatra against the central Indonesian govern-
ment. Taipei was accused of giving its support to this rebellion (Li, Z. H.
2003: 363). Consequently, all Chinese-language newspapers were banned in
April 1958, although left-wing Chinese-language newspapers were allowed
to republish a month later (Suryadinata 1978: 139). In 1960, all Chinese-
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language newspapers were once again banned following a major anti-Chinese
outbreak in Indonesia. The ban was only lifted when China–Indonesia
relations had improved (Suryadinata 1978: 139). However, the status of the
Chinese-language press after 1960 was very uncertain and always subject to
closure by the government.9
During the Guided Democracy period (1959–65), peranakan newspapers
were under pressure to employ more indigenous Indonesians and to change
their titles to Indonesian ones (Suryadinata 1978: 136). Sin Po first changed
its name to Panca Warta, and later changed it to Warta Bakti – a name
given by President Sukarno (Li, Z. H. 2003: 43).10 This change of name also
represented a shift in identity for Sin Po – from promoting Chinese nation-
alism and embracing a huaqiao identity to espousing Indonesian nationalism
and endorsing Indonesian nationality. By this time many Chinese had already
become Indonesian citizens (Li, Z. H. 2003: 43).
Xin Bao only re-emerged in November 1963 after having been forced by
the government to close down in 1958. It changed its name to Zhongcheng
Bao (which literally means ‘loyal newspaper’), the Chinese translation of
Warta Bakti. The re-emergence of Xin Bao gave the Chinese-language press
in Indonesia a facelift. After 1963 it had to forsake its huaqiao mentality
and shift its orientation and loyalty entirely to Indonesia, as it was now
owned by Indonesian nationals (Suryadinata 1978: 140; Li, Z. H. 2003: 43).
Zhongcheng Bao pledged its loyalty to Indonesia and Sukarno by publishing
the president’s speeches and political thoughts every day on the front page
of the daily (Li, Z. H. 2003: 44).
However, the Chinese-language press after 1960 was short-lived. On 30
September 1965, the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) and Beijing were
allegedly involved in a coup attempt. Together with left-wing peranakan
papers such as Warta Bakti, all Chinese-language newspapers were indis-
criminately branded pro-PKI and banned in October 1965. Most directors,
editors and journalists were arrested and detained on Buru Island without
due legal process, marking the end of Sin Po and the other Chinese news-
papers (both Indonesian and Chinese-language) in Indonesia (Pandiangan
2003: 413).
Suharto’s New Order: the dark ages for the Chinese press
Chinese-Indonesian writers have called the Suharto regime (also known 
as the ‘New Order’) the ‘dark ages’ of Chinese culture, because all ‘three
treasures’ (san bao) of Chinese culture – Chinese organizations, Chinese-
medium schools and Chinese media11 – were banned by the New Order
government (Li, Z. H. 2003: 323; Yinhua Zhisheng, July 2004, p. 14). The
New Order government perceived ‘Chineseness’ to be incompatible with
Indonesia’s national personality and problematic for national integration and
unity. One of the reasons was that the Chinese came under suspicion of
supporting leftist politics and the PKI, both of which were allegedly involved
96 Chang-yau Hoon
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in the abortive coup attempt of 1965. Moreover, the dominant position of
the Chinese in the Indonesian economy led the Suharto government to label
‘Chineseness’ as ‘The Chinese Problem’ (or Masalah Cina).
Viewing ‘Chineseness’ as a ‘problem’ that threatened national integra-
tion and unity legitimized the New Order government’s attempt to solve it.
The policy makers endorsed a military-backed ‘Assimilation Programme’
(Program Pembauran), which prescribed the total dissolution of any marks
and identities of ‘Chineseness’. After 1966, Chinese publications and the
use of Chinese language in public were officially banned in Indonesia. 
No Chinese-language press was permitted except the government-sponsored
Yindunixiya Ribao (Harian Indonesia or The Indonesia Daily), which aimed
to convey the official voice of the government to the Chinese community,
especially to those who did not read Bahasa Indonesia.
The editors of The Indonesia Daily were native Indonesians who were
related to the military newspaper Berita Yudha (Suryadinata 1978: 140–1).
Coppel (1983: 162–3) notes that all copies of The Indonesia Daily were
written first in Indonesian and then translated into Chinese. The translations
were checked carefully by Sinologists on the staff. This newspaper was
known to be a tool used by the military to indoctrinate the Chinese
community with new restrictions during the New Order. Sudharmono, the
secretary-general of the Indonesian Hakka Association, argued that, ‘[t]he
paper was a lie, to make the world think that we [Chinese-Indonesians] were
not oppressed’ (Djalal 2001).
The relationship between The Indonesia Daily and Chinese-Indonesians
can be described as a love–hate relationship – they value this newspaper,
yet, at the same time, despise it. According to Sukisman, the chief editor of
The Indonesia Daily, the newspaper reached its distribution peak in the early
1990s, when about 100,000 copies were sold every day. He also noted that
the advertisement contents of the newspaper were mostly obituaries, marriage
and divorce notifications, and announcements of the opening of new busi-
nesses (Kompas, 14 January 2001). This shows that The Indonesia Daily
played a key role in mediating information within the Chinese community
in Indonesia during an era when no other Chinese news media were allowed.
Chinese-Indonesian writers also strategically utilized the supplementary
section of this newspaper to publish their articles and poems (Wen 2003:
368–9). Hence, in spite of the resentment of the military control of this news-
paper, it had ironically become one of the ‘agencies’ that enabled the Chinese
to be informed about their ‘community’ and prevented Chinese-language
literature from disappearing from the face of Indonesia.
‘Out of darkness’:the Chinese press in post-Suharto’s Indonesia
After experiencing over three decades of darkness, the Chinese-Indonesian
press can finally welcome the light of the morning sun!
(Huang 2003: 391; my translation)
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To the Chinese community, especially those who had been deprived of the
opportunity to use Chinese language and read Chinese publications, the post-
Suharto era signifies an end to ‘darkness’ and the beginning of light.12
President Abdurrahman Wahid’s lifting of the official ban on Chinese printed
matter on 21 February 2001 was hailed by The International Chinese News-
weekly (Yazhou Zhoukan) as a ‘joyous moment for the second springtime’
of Chinese culture.13
The Indonesian-language Chinese press: a humble start
It can be seen from Table 4.1 that most of the Chinese press in post-Suharto
Indonesia was published in Chinese language. There were only five
Indonesian-language Chinese publications that emerged in post-1998 Jakarta:
Suar 168, SIMPATIK, Sinergi Bangsa, Sinar Glodok and Suara Baru. None
of them was a daily newspaper. Nevertheless, most of them have ceased
publication after a few years except for Sinergi Indonesia (under a new name
and management) and Sinar Glodok, which still existed in 2004.
Some of the reasons for the short lifespan of the Indonesian-language
Chinese press are related to the nature, content and coverage of these publi-
cations. For instance, the tabloid Suar 168 was predominantly concerned
with interpreting Chinese culture in the context of Indonesian society and
tended to avoid political discussions (Pandiangan 2003: 416). Pandiangan
noted that this kind of focus ‘is a post-1998 trend that taps into a wide-
spread nostalgia in the Chinese community for an open discussion of their
culture, which had been virtually taboo for so long’ (2003: 416). I argued
elsewhere that the obsession with reviving Chinese culture and indulging in
nostalgia would not satisfy the demand of the younger readers who are more
interested in contemporary political and social issues (Hoon 2004a: 14).
However, not all of the Indonesian-language Chinese press focused on
Chinese culture. In fact, SIMPATIK, Suara Baru and Sinergi Bangsa
(changed to Sinergi Indonesia in 2003) were all more interested in non-
cultural matters such as politics, social issues and economics (Pandiangan
2003: 416). These magazines focused on the eradication of discrimination
and upholding justice in the community. They also attempted to reconstruct
Chinese-Indonesian identity in this nation, especially after the May 1998
anti-Chinese riots. During the riots, Chinese-owned shops and businesses
were looted and Chinese women were reportedly raped in Jakarta and other
cities of Indonesia.
SIMPATIK was a monthly bulletin published by the Jakarta-based
Chinese-Indonesian Youth Solidarity for Justice movement (SIMPATIK), 
an organization that was set up after the riots in May 1998 (Pandiangan
2003: 416–18). This organization was very active after the riots in exposing
the injustice and discrimination that had been experienced by the Chinese
in Indonesia. However, as time passed and the riots slowly became an 
event of the past, this organization began to lose its zeal and became 
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inactive. Thus, its bulletin also disappeared. Suara Baru was also a 
monthly magazine published by a Chinese-Indonesian organization in Jakarta
– INTI (Perhimpunan Tionghoa Indonesia or The Association of Chinese-
Indonesians), with the same mission as SIMPATIK. However, some sponsors
of Suara Baru decided to cut back financial support for the magazine because
they thought that a magazine that focused on politics was too sensitive and
dangerous.14 This shows that, although Reformasi and democratization have
been taking place in Indonesia, some Chinese (especially the older genera-
tion) still tend to avoid politics due to the trauma they experienced in the
persecution of 1965 and the anti-Chinese violence of 1998.
Idealist press struggling to survive in a commercial world: 
Sinergi Indonesia
After SIMPATIK and Suara Baru came to a halt, Sinergi Indonesia became
the only Indonesian-language Chinese press in Indonesia to focus on polit-
ical and social issues, especially those related to the Chinese minority. Sinergi
Indonesia is a monthly magazine published by the Indonesia Sinergy
Research Institute (Lembaga Kajian Sinergi Indonesia) headed by a former
member of Baperki – a left-wing Chinese organization during Sukarno’s era.
He argues that the Chinese-language press that has re-emerged has been too
obsessed with the euphoria of the lifting of the ban on Chinese language
and culture, and has overlooked the importance of finding a solution to ‘The
Chinese Problem’. The main objectives of Sinergi Indonesia are to educate
Chinese-Indonesians about politics, since they have been separated from the
political world for more than three decades. They aim to ‘straighten up’
(meluruskan) the misperceptions and prejudices about Chinese-Indonesians
held by Indonesian society; and to create a new approach to accommodate
or synergize Chinese-Indonesians beyond the assimilation and integration
approaches (Sinergi Indonesia, March 2003 and Interview, 2 June 2004).
To achieve its objectives, Sinergi Indonesia focuses on Indonesian politics
and history and the discrimination that Chinese-Indonesians continue to expe-
rience. It discusses and constructs discourses on how Chinese people should
live and be accepted as an integral part of Indonesian society. It also covers
many issues that were taboo during the Suharto era, such as the G30S, or
September 30 Movement, in 1965. This is not surprising since the editors
of this press belong to an older generation and are inclined to indulge in
nostalgia for the past. In order to fulfil its ‘cultural mission’ of reminding
readers of their Chinese roots, Sinergi Indonesia also publishes articles on
Feng Shui, Sam Kok (The Romance of the Three Kingdoms), Chinese medi-
cine and Chinese traditions. However, these features, to my mind, do not
add much attraction to the magazine because it is doubtful that many young
people would be interested in these articles.
The chief editor of Sinergi Indonesia acknowledges that young 
readers are not yet interested in this magazine (Interview, 2 June 2004). The 
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discrepancy between the media practitioners who mainly belong to an older
generation and the potential younger generation of readers reflects a ‘gener-
ation gap’ dilemma faced by most of the post-Suharto Chinese press.
Self-essentialism and the perpetuation of stereotypes: Sinar Glodok
Sinar Glodok is a bi-weekly newspaper that is circulated in Glodok – the
oldest ‘Chinatown’ in Jakarta. Consisting of 12 pages, and covering mainly
business news and advertisements, this newspaper is obviously commercially
motivated. It reports on the business activities around the Glodok area and
other major Chinese business districts such as Mangga Dua and Kelapa
Gading. The commercial news includes news about the latest models and
price lists of mobile phones and other technology products, new restaurants,
property, the price of gold and foreign exchange rates.
This newspaper taps into and perpetuates the popular but unfavour-
able stereotype in Indonesia that the Chinese are ‘economic animals’ and
‘apolitical’. Through its contents, we witness the production and circula-
tion of the dehumanizing stereotype of the Chinese. This can be seen not
only in the newspaper’s business focus but also in its representations of
‘Chineseness’. For example, the column ‘apa siapa’ (what and who) contains
stories of successful Chinese figures, all of whom ‘coincidentally’ have a
profession in business. It also publishes cartoons of Chinese people who are
(re)presented as traders, wearing traditional Qing Dynasty Chinese costumes,
with slanting eyes, pigtails and round caps. In this way, Sinar Glodok has
differentiated itself from other mainstream Indonesian-language newspapers.
I would argue that such stereotypes of Chinese occupational identity as 
‘all Chinese people are traders’ has the dangerous potential to inflame anti-
Chinese feelings.
Although Sinar Glodok is not published in Chinese, it contains many
interesting cultural features that display the Chinese identity of this news-
paper. In some instances these features make it look even more ‘Chinese’
than the Chinese-language press. According to Allen (2003: 392), ‘the
symbolism of the choice of Chinese identity. . .is highly significant. It is a
theme that had lain dormant for more than 30 years, and the very fact of its
revivification is important.’ For instance, on the top left corner of the cover
page of this newspaper is the date of the current issue. Below the normal
Western calendar 19–22 February 2004, it also shows the ‘Chinese’ calendar
29 Cia Gwee-03 Ji Gwee, Imlek 2555 (lunar year 2555), Shio Monyet (Year
of Monkey).15 This is interesting because none of the Chinese-language
newspapers in Jakarta uses a ‘Chinese’ calendar for its date.
A cultural ‘mission’ or effort to resinicize Chinese-Indonesians to be more
conscious of their cultural values and traditions is one of the main objec-
tives of most of the Chinese presses that emerged in post-Suharto Indonesia
(this point will be elaborated further in the next section). The short story
mentioned above was about a successful Chinese businessman (his ‘Chinese-
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ness’ is suggested in his Chinese name). When his acquaintance asked him
what his secret of success was, he answered with a Chinese proverb (that
was also the title of the story) about a ‘hard work’ ethic. This story implied
that people with Chinese values and work ethics would be more successful
in doing business than those Indonesians who do not have these values.16
Similar to the cartoon section mentioned above, this story employed a
metonym that essentialized the ethnic character of the Chinese: Chinese
names stand for Chinese ethnicity and Chinese always (and only) enter 
into business as their occupation. In Allen’s words, ‘[t]he reductionist 
nature of metonymy leads to the essentialism of Chineseness . . . and the
perpetuation, rather than the deconstruction, of commonly held stereotypes’
(2003: 395).
Another example of the effort of Sinar Glodok to resinicize its readers
can be found in the column entitled ‘Tekat Sayang’ (Aixin man tianxia, or
‘Love is everywhere’). This column publishes Chinese proverbs, words of
wisdom and short stories sent by readers. It presents them in Chinese char-
acters, followed by pinyin and Indonesian translations below. It seems as
though the newspaper is trying to promote Chinese values to the Chinese-
Indonesians who did not receive a Chinese education.17
An interesting feature of Sinar Glodok that illustrates the hybridized
language used by Chinese-Indonesian people can be seen in its short story
column, mentioned above. The short stories are written in Indonesian but
Hokkien and Mandarin pinyin are also used. For instance, in the 19–22
February 2004 issue, Mandarin pinyin was used for the title of the story
(which happened to be a Chinese proverb). Hokkien names (such as Ko A
Heng) were used to indicate that the characters in the story were ethnic
Chinese; and Chinese-Malay expressions such as ‘Lu’ and ‘Gue’ were used
in the conversational dialogues. The hybrid mixture of Indonesian language,
Hokkien and Chinese terms and Chinese-Malay expressions is common in
daily conversation within the Chinese community in Indonesia.
Sinar Glodok acknowledges the lived reality of the hybrid condition of
Chinese-Indonesians by showing the mixed use of language in daily conver-
sation. However, the uncritical use of metonymy and stereotypes suggest 
an essentialized character of ‘Chineseness’ and serve ‘to perpetuate, rather
than challenge’ the ‘fixedness’ of ethnic identity (Allen 2003: 399). By
holding on to an essentialist concept of ethnicity, Sinar Glodok reinforces
the image of Chinese-Indonesians as ‘once a Chinese, always a Chinese’,
suggesting that the hybridization and localization of Chinese-Indonesians
never happened.
The need for an Indonesian-language Chinese press: a new 
Sin Po, perhaps?
There is no debate over whether an Indonesian-language Chinese press is
needed in Indonesia within the Chinese community. The Chinese community
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sees the urgent need to set up Chinese media in the Indonesian language
that can represent the aspirations and voices of Chinese-Indonesians (Li, Z.
H. 2004: 332–4; Sinergi Indonesia, December 2003: 3–6). However, one
might wonder why Chinese-Indonesians need their own press rather than
remaining with and reading the mainstream Indonesian press.
Articles published by the Centre for Information, Education and
Publication in Sumatra (Kippas or Kajian Informasi, Pendidikan, dan
Penerbitan Sumatera) in 2002 indicate that the mainstream Indonesian press
has always perceived the ethnic Chinese as a homogeneous group and
‘Chineseness’ as fixed and unchanging (Anto 2002; Irene 2002; Prasetyo
2002). The authors studied four newspapers published in Medan and noted
that these had reproduced and perpetuated three negative stereotypes of the
Chinese: they are disloyal, exclusive and economic animals. They demon-
strated that these publications had always deliberately ethnicized cases when
Chinese people had committed a crime. In such cases, either their original
Chinese names were published or the title WNI keturunan (Indonesian
citizens of foreign descent, a tag commonly used to refer to the Chinese)
was used below their names to identify their Chinese ethnicity. On the other
hand, the press never identified the ethnicity of Chinese-Indonesians like
Susy Susanti and Kwik Gian Gie, who have made major positive contribu-
tions to the nation.18
These demonizing representations of the ethnic Chinese in the mainstream
press justify the cause for an Indonesian-language Chinese press that can serve
as a mouthpiece of the Chinese to ‘straighten up’ the (mis)perceptions in the
mainstream society and function as a communicative tool within the Chinese
community. However, as discussed above, Sinergi Indonesia has failed to be
the ideal press that the Chinese are looking for because it is too political, too
backward-looking and too irresponsive to the needs of the contemporary
market. On the other hand, Sinar Glodok is merely a commercial press. It is
the product of 32 years of internalizing the stereotypes and essentialist views
that have been held by the mainstream society. It does not challenge them. 
If these two Indonesian-language Chinese presses cannot represent Chinese
aspirations, what kind of press do Chinese-Indonesians want?
Some Chinese community leaders have suggested establishing a new Sin
Po (Li, Z. H. 2004: 335–7). Sin Po was closed down in 1965 but its spirit
and influence have never been forgotten by Chinese-Indonesians of that
generation. The term ‘new’ indicates the identities of Chinese-Indonesians
who have become transformed since the time when Sin Po was first estab-
lished. Benny Setiono, the Chairman of INTI, Jakarta, stated that the new
Sin Po should adopt an Indonesian orientation or a luodi shenggen approach
(fallen leaves, rooted locally), in contrast to the huaqiao (overseas Chinese)
stance. It should be a press that goes hand in hand with the mainstream
society, and should be loyal and constructive to Indonesia, and, at the same
time, convey the voice, information and activities of the Chinese community
(Li, Z. H. 2004: 336).
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I am tempted to ask: why is Sin Po still lingering in the post-Suharto 
era? Is it because it has become a legend or is it because the people who
suggested it mostly still indulge in nostalgia for the splendid days of Sin
Po? Whatever the reason, it is clear that Chinese-Indonesians are longing
for an influential, powerful and daring press like Sin Po. However, Pandian-
gan (2003: 418–19) has reminded us that the ‘Chinese press can no longer
simply rely on idealism and sentiment . . . what the Chinese community
needs is alternative, intelligent reading matter that can contribute to the
diversity of this nation’. This is certainly a challenge for the new Sin Po if
it is successfully revived.
The Chinese-language press: a display of multiculturalism
As mentioned above, the ‘new’ space opened for the Chinese press in the
post-Suharto era is dominated by Chinese-language publications. Table 4.1
shows that there were around ten Chinese-language publications, and only
two Indonesian-language Chinese publications, circulating in Jakarta in 2004.
Nevertheless, this baihua qifang (hundred flowers bloom) phenomenon of
the Chinese-language press should be read within the context of a shift in
ethnic policy in post-Suharto Indonesia. Elsewhere I have argued that:
[t]he downfall of Suharto has given rise to an identity politics across
the whole of Indonesian society. Multiculturalism as a policy has been
contemplated and endorsed by Indonesia’s new power holders as a
preferred policy for rebuilding the nation, consistent with Indonesia’s
national motto – ‘Unity in Diversity’.
(Hoon 2004b: 19; Suryadinata 2004a)
Multiculturalism as a policy tends to (over)emphasize the representation
of ‘difference’ and assume all members of an ethnic group are equally
committed to that culture. As Nira Yuval-Davis observes:
They [multicultural policy makers] tend to construct the members of
minority collectivities as basically homogeneous, speaking with a unified
cultural or racial voice. These voices are constructed so as to make them
as distinct as possible from the majority culture, so as to make them
‘different’. Thus, within multiculturalism, the more traditional and
distanced from the majority culture the voice of the ‘community repre-
sentatives’ is, the more ‘authentic’ it would be perceived to be within
such construction.
(1997: 200)
This new multicultural environment has provided an ideal breeding 
ground in which the Chinese-language press can proliferate. The publication
of the Chinese-language press in Indonesia is strongly encouraged by the
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government because it demonstrates the new policy makers’ determination
in implementing Reformasi and abandoning the old assimilationist ideol-
ogy, whether this is the case in reality or not. To the Chinese-Indonesians,
the re-emergence of Chinese-language publications has important symbolic
meanings, notwithstanding the fact that most of them no longer read or 
speak Chinese. It signifies victory over the ‘dark forces’ of Suharto’s regime 
and the beginning of a bright future for the Chinese in Indonesia. Even 
though familiarity or capability with Chinese language no longer reflects 
the ‘Chineseness’ of most Chinese-Indonesians, the revival of Chinese-
language publications is still perceived as an acknowledgement of their
culture and identity. Werbner asserts that this ‘strategic essentializing of 
self-representation’ (1997: 248) is a ‘rhetorical performance in which an
imagined community is invoked’ (1997: 230) and can be ‘culturally em-
powering’ (1997: 248).
Negotiating multiple identities
As I have argued in the earlier parts of this chapter, the Chinese in Indonesia
have never been a unified and homogeneous group. The Chinese press reflects
the different identities of the Chinese in Indonesia at different times. The
post-Suharto Chinese-language press is notably different in its identities
compared to those before and during Sukarno’s Old Order. The most apparent
difference is that the press no longer represents the huaqiao perspective and
has adopted an Indonesian identity. However, this does not render this
identity singular. Following the influence of globalization and transnational
media links, the Chinese-language press in post-Suharto Indonesia is
constantly negotiating between the local and the global; and striving to be
both Indonesian and Chinese at the same time.
Among the ten Chinese publications, there are five daily newspapers, three
monthly magazines, one weekly tabloid and one online newspaper. The two
largest daily newspapers are The International Daily (Guoji Ribao), which
circulates around 30,000 copies a day, and The Universal Daily (Shijie
Ribao), which circulates around 10,000 copies a day. It is not uncommon
to hear readers remarking that The International Daily is a pro-China news-
paper, while The Universal Daily is pro-Taiwan. This can be understood
from the place of origin of these two newspapers. Both of these newspapers
originated overseas: the former from Los Angeles (although locally owned
in Indonesia) and the latter from Taiwan. Although they report Indonesian
news from their offices in Jakarta, most of their international news is deliv-
ered by their respective head offices. Hence, it could be expected that their
ideology is very much influenced by, if not reflective of, their head offices.
The International Daily includes Wen Wei Po (Wen Hui Bao Southeast Asia
Edition), a Hong Kong newspaper, and China’s Renmin Ribao (People’s
Daily Overseas Edition) in its publication, making it the ‘thickest’ Chinese
newspaper in Indonesia.
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Some older-generation Chinese-Indonesians still conceptualize the ident-
ity of today’s Chinese press as a singular entity: it is either pro-China or
pro-Taiwan.19 This is the case, perhaps, because they went through the period
when overseas Chinese politics were basically polarized between the pro-
China and pro-Taiwan camps. The reason for them assuming that there is
continuity between the re-emerged Chinese press and the Chinese press of
the 1950s is that they perceive the competition between The International
Daily and The Universal Daily as resembling the heated rivalry between Xin
Bao and Tiansheng Ribao in the 1950s. Their obsession with the past has
blinded them from seeing the multiple identities of today’s press. They also
fail to see the shift in interest of most contemporary publications from ideo-
logical competition to commercial motivation. If anything, the competition
between The International Daily and The Universal Daily is commercial
rather than ideological. Unlike Xin Bao and Tiansheng Ribao, these two
presses have never attacked each other’s political stance.
In fact, The International Daily and The Universal Daily in Indonesia
deny that they are politically orientated to China or Taiwan. The chief editor
of The International Daily in Jakarta contends that:
The International Daily is pro-Indonesia. . . . Our objective is to help
the Chinese-Indonesians to understand and know Indonesia better.
Chinese-Indonesians should be united to love this country. The reason
that we included Wen Wei Pao and Renmin Ribao is because there is
demand in the United States for these newspapers since there are a great
proportion of Chinese migrants in the States that came from China. So
our head office collaborated with these two newspapers and gained
approval to distribute them. . . . In Indonesia, there are many people who
want to read news about Hong Kong and China because China’s
economy has become stronger. Hence, mau tak mau (whether we want
it or not), we need to include them [in our newspaper]
(Interview, 12 July 2004; my translation)
It can be seen that the contemporary Chinese press can be multiple in its
identities. The International Daily demonstrates that it is politically orien-
tated to Indonesia, notwithstanding the heavy focus on China to cater for
the rising demand of readers for news about the booming Chinese economy.
The Universal Daily proclaims that it is ‘a newspaper that belongs to the
ethnic Chinese in Indonesia’ (see advertisement section of The Universal
Daily). A senior reporter at The Universal Daily stated that:
we are Indonesians and we should be loyal to Indonesia but we are also
ethnic Chinese, our ancestors came from China. We are truly Indonesian
and truly Chinese (wanquan de yinniren yeshi wanquan de huaren) and
we only have a kinship relation with China (qingqi guanxi).
(Interview, 11 May 2004; my translation)
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This shows that, even though a newspaper has a transnational origin, it can
also adopt a local identity once it is committed to that locality and employing
local people on its staff. The pro-China and pro-Taiwan dichotomy is also
problematic for The Universal Daily because its Taiwan head office adopts
an anti-Taiwan independence stance.20 Does this thus render it a pro-China
press? Or is the dichotomy too narrow to define the contemporary Chinese
press in Indonesia?
A smaller Chinese newspaper that was established in Surabaya in 2000,
Qiandao Ribao (The Archipelago Daily), sees itself as an ethnic newspaper
in Indonesia. The director of this press, a 70-year-old Chinese in Surabaya,
believes that the Chinese are one of the many suku (ethnic groups) in Indo-
nesia. Like other suku, the Chinese should be entitled to the right to express
and promote their own characteristics, language, traditions and customs.
Among the aims of this Chinese-Indonesian-oriented newspaper is to keep
and promote these aspects of Chinese culture, as well as improve harmony
between ethnicities. Nevertheless, adopting a Chinese-Indonesian identity
does not prevent this press from taking a stance on politics between 
China and Taiwan. This press is supportive of the ‘one China policy’, consist-
ent with Indonesia’s official stance (Interview, 18 May 2004). Hence, it can
be seen that there is still a general ‘obsession with China’ in the local Chinese
press. However, this should not be read simply as an assertion of primordial-
ism and disloyalty to Indonesia, but as an expression of the multiple-
rootedness and multiple identities of the older generation of Chinese-
Indonesians. Indeed, the aspiration of the director of The Archipelago Daily
for the younger generation of Chinese-Indonesians is that they can ‘lizu 
bendi mianxiang shijie (stand locally but face globally)’ (Interview, 18 May
2004; my translation). This negotiation between global and local shows 
that flexible and multiple subjectivities are increasingly becoming a reality
of life, and an insistence on the idea of singular identity is becoming more
unrealistic.
Another interesting feature of the Chinese-language press is its tendency
to imagine itself as being a part of the so-called Chinese diaspora. According
to Ang:
with the increased possibilities of keeping in touch with the old home-
land and with co-ethnics in other parts of the world through faster and
cheaper jet transport, mass media and electronic telecommunications, 
. . . migrant groups are collectively more inclined to see themselves not
as minorities within nation-states, but as members of global diasporas
which span national boundaries.
(2001: 76)
This imagination of a global Chinese identity is illuminated in two 
aspects of coverage in the Chinese-language press: entertainment news and 
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special reports on successful Chinese overseas. I have noted that all Chinese-
language publications in Jakarta only publish entertainment news on
‘Oriental’ (read: China, Taiwan and Hong Kong) stars. The exception is
Harian Indonesia, which does not publish much entertainment news. Some
of them cover Hollywood gossip occasionally but none has reported enter-
tainment news on Indonesian artists. This phenomenon points to the
transnational identity of the Chinese-language press, facilitated by tech-
nology such as the Internet. Both The International Daily and The Universal
Daily get their daily supply of entertainment news from their head offices
via email. Other Chinese newspapers and magazines download and appro-
priate the latest ‘Oriental’ entertainment news from the Internet. The
interesting question to be asked is why they prefer ‘Oriental’ entertainment
news to Indonesian? Part of the reason is that ‘Oriental’ popular culture 
has gained huge popularity in Indonesia over the past few years, in part 
thanks to the official loosening of media control and the establishment of
cable television in 1999. Another reason, according to a senior reporter at
The Universal Press, is their shortage of staff in entertainment coverage
(Interview, 23 July 2004). Most of the reporters in the Chinese-language
press belong to an older generation that is 50 years old and above. It is
understandable that this generation finds it challenging to follow contem-
porary news on Indonesian artists. However, this reason is hardly satis-
factory: if the Chinese-language press can translate political news from
Indonesian-language sources, they could arguably also translate entertain-
ment news from these sources. Hence, it could be argued that their 
focus on ‘Oriental’ entertainment news is a desperate attempt to identify
with the ‘Oriental’ popular culture ‘centre’, which is perceived to share the
same ‘root’.
Chinese-language newspapers and magazines have also been reporting
regularly on stories of successful people of Chinese descent who live in
America or other countries outside China. The ‘news’ magazine New Indo-
nesia and ASEAN publishes these stories under its section on ‘huaren
dongtai’ (the situation of Chinese) and the tabloid The Capital Weekly
publishes them under its ‘huashe jingying’ (the heroes of Chinese society)
section.21 These publications champion successful Chinese migrants as 
role models for Chinese-Indonesians. Their stories are meant to inspire 
the Chinese-Indonesians, who, the Chinese-language press believes, share
the ‘same’ experience of being part of the ‘diaspora’. This diasporic imagin-
ation assumes a (trans)nationalistic pride of belonging to the Chinese 
‘race’, even though they are in different locations. The promotion of imag-
ined relations with the diasporic Chinese community may be cherished by 
older-generation Chinese-Indonesians who were Chinese educated but it is 
doubtful that the younger non-Chinese-speaking generation identifies with
this imagined community.
1111
2
3
4
5111
6
7
8
9
1011
1
2
3111
4
5
6
7
8
9
20111
1
2
3
4
5111
6
7
8
9
30111
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
40111
1
2
3
44
45111
Chinese press in post-Suharto Indonesia 109
4577P CHIN DIASPORA-A/rev  21/3/06 12:21 pm  Page 109
Politics and the Chinese-language press
After the fall of Suharto, many ethnic Chinese took advantage of the political
liberalization to set up organizations to fight for the abolition of discrimin-
atory laws, defend their rights and promote solidarity between ethnic groups
in Indonesia. However, the trauma from the closure of all Chinese media
and the arrest and persecution of staff in the Chinese press in 1965 has
deterred some from venturing into political territory. The director of The
Archipelago Daily admits that his newspaper has focused more on cultural
issues than political discussion because he believes that Chinese-Indonesians
are not very keen on politics (Interview, 18 May 2004).
Nevertheless, not all the Chinese-language presses lean towards The
Archipelago Daily’s view. Some of them are very enthusiastic about
contributing to the new wave of political activism. They report political news
about Indonesia, especially those related to the Chinese. For example, they
publish news about discrimination, new official policies on the Chinese and
Chinese political candidates in the 2004 general election. These elections
have also provided an opportunity for the Chinese press to get involved in
the political education of the Chinese community in Indonesia.22 For instance,
The International Daily and The Universal Daily have sponsored seminars
that were organized by Chinese organizations in Jakarta. However, this does
not mean that the Chinese-language press is totally comfortable with the
world of politics. Many Chinese publications are cautiously testing the water
and practising the New Order style of self-censorship, in order to remain
active but safe. Most Chinese-language newspapers limit themselves mainly
to reporting news and eschew politics and political discourse in Indonesia.
This is different from the strategies of both the pre-Suharto Chinese 
presses, which were more politically orientated, and quality mainstream,
contemporary Indonesian newspapers (such as Kompas). Besides paranoia,
the Chinese-language press also does not have the expertise to produce in-
depth political commentary or analysis. Due to the decades-long ban on
Chinese education in Indonesia, it is understandable that most editors and
reporters of Chinese-language newspapers are older-generation Chinese.23
Many Chinese-language publications are facing the difficulty of acquiring
younger staff who are competent in Chinese language.24 Even if they are
competent, it remains doubtful whether these employees would have an
adequate knowledge of journalism.
Chinese-language magazines have been more active in publishing 
articles and commentaries on politics than Chinese-language newspapers.
There are at least three Chinese-language magazines in Jakarta that give
significant weight to politics. They are Xin Yindong (The New Indonesia 
and ASEAN, previously Yinni yu Dongxie or Indonesia and ASEAN), Hu
Sheng (Media Aspirations) and Yinhua Zhisheng (The Voice of Indonesian
Chinese Magazine). The New Indonesia and ASEAN is the most long-lived
magazine of the three. It was not registered in Indonesia but in Hong Kong
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in 1990 due to the prohibition of Chinese publications in Indonesia. It started
out as a small publication (then called The Indonesia and Asean) that
published news of Indonesia’s politics and economy. This news was in high
demand by Chinese-Indonesian business people in Hong Kong and by
guiqiao (Chinese-Indonesians who returned to China in the 1950s and 
1960s and later moved to Hong Kong), because many of them still had
family and relatives in Indonesia. Copies of this magazine were later sneaked
into Indonesia illegally for circulation and distribution. Bookstores selling
this magazine hid them behind other magazines on the racks or kept them
under the counter. Readers threw the magazine away after they read it
because Chinese characters were banned by the New Order government
(Interview, 5 May 2004).
After the fall of Suharto, The Indonesia and ASEAN increased its dis-
cussions of politics and the legal rights of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.
It also provided a space for readers to contribute articles and commentaries
on politics. This ‘space’ was often used by readers to initiate discussions
about certain Chinese community leaders or organizations, which sometimes
ended up in a series of personal attacks and provocative debates. These
discussions eventually offended some Chinese figures and forced this maga-
zine to change its management in late 2003. After a management reshuffle,
the magazine retained its name but gave its contents a facelift. It was trans-
formed into a leisure and lifestyle magazine covering issues such as beauty,
sex, health, sports and entertainment. However, this facelift did not ‘sell’ as
expected by the new management, in a predominantly aging readership
market. The subscribers did not find the issues attractive and demanded the
return of the old format (Interview, 5 July 2004). The new format of the
magazine ceased after the publication of only three issues. The old manage-
ment re-established the magazine in March 2004 under a new name, 
Xin Yindong, which means The New Indonesia and ASEAN. Xin Yindong
proudly proclaimed its motto on its front cover: ‘For the continuation of the
original taste of Yinni yu Dongxie, [we] stand firmly in an Indonesian
perspective and bravely speak of those that others dare not speak of.’ Living
up to its motto, it once again publishes readers’ articles that provoke debates.
The diverse opinions and internal politics within the Chinese community
again reflect its heterogeneity.
The ‘coming out’ of the closet of political avoidance can also be seen in
two magazines that are published by alumni groups. Formerly these were
known to have been more concerned about cultural rather than political
matters. Media Aspirations is published by alumni from former (pre-1966)
Chinese schools in Jakarta while The Voice of Indonesian Chinese is
published by alumni who were educated in Taiwan. Media Aspirations
devoted many issues in 2004 to the general election. The Voice of Indonesian
Chinese, on the other hand, focuses more on the political developments
between China and Taiwan. Most of the political commentaries and articles
in Media Aspirations are translated from mainstream Indonesian media. This
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shows that, despite the lack of experience and knowledge about political
commentary, this magazine is still committed to carrying out the political
education of its readers – presumably mostly alumni from pre-1966 Chinese
schools. It should be mentioned that translating articles from Indonesian to
Chinese is not an uncommon practice in the Chinese-language press.
However, the inaccuracy in translations and the lack of proper references or
acknowledgement of sources show that the Chinese press is still far from
being professional.
Even though the Chinese-language press has become active in discussing
political issues, it is doubtful that this political activism has much potential
for empowering Chinese-Indonesians. The main reason is that it does not
provide much space for discourse construction other than reporting or trans-
lating political commentaries from the mainstream Indonesian press. Second,
the market for the Chinese-language press is insignificant. Only the older
generation has the language ability to read such media. This language barrier
has also limited the ability of the Chinese-language press to reach main-
stream society and the Indonesian government. Therefore, the discussions,
debates and discourses that have been stimulated in these media are circu-
lated only within a very limited segment of the Chinese community.
Cultural ‘mission’ and resinicization
Viewing itself as one of the gatekeepers of Chinese culture, the post-Suharto
Chinese-language press values the task of reviving Chinese education and
supporting Chinese organizations. It sees these as its main responsibilities.
Most of the Chinese-language press in Indonesia has an objective of reviving
and promoting Chinese-language and culture, and preventing it from
vanishing in Indonesia. The management of these publications, presumably
all older-generation Chinese, feel apologetic about the discontinuation (duan
cheng) of Chinese language among the younger generation and think that it
is their responsibility to resinicize the generation that has ‘lost’ its Chinese
identity. A chief editor of a Chinese-language publication put this bluntly:
Chinese culture has a fine history of 5,000 years. Assimilated
[Indonesianized] Chinese have lost this noble culture. They are notably
[unChinese] in their personality, including their morals. For instance,
they are lazy, laid back, like to enjoy life [without thinking about the
future], do not respect their elders and do not love their teachers. People
with Chinese culture are more hardworking, diligent and thrifty.25 . . .
We need to promote Confucian moral values to these people. Owing to
the rise of China, people are more attracted to learn Chinese because
there is now economic motivation.
(Interview, 12 July 2004; my translation)
This view of the young generation has motivated the Chinese-language press
to be determined to resinicize them. They see the resinicization project as a
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cultural ‘mission’. This cultural ‘mission’ has promoted a fraternity of com-
rades rather than rivalries between some Chinese-language publications.26
The ‘missionary’ mentality is also often used as the reason for Chinese-
language publications to carry on, despite the fact that many of them are
making a loss.
The Chinese-language press perceives the rise of China’s economy as a
major force that has contributed to achieving the press’s cultural ‘mission’.
A director of a Chinese-language publication stated:
Chinese language has become a world trend because of the growing
Chinese economy. . . . Young Chinese-Indonesians learn Mandarin for
the economic prospects. The search for roots will come later – after they
learn about Chinese culture.
(Interview, 18 May 2004)
Chinese language is often seen as equivalent to Chinese culture. Many
Chinese-Indonesians of the older generation believe that, by learning the
language, the younger generation will be influenced by the virtues of Chinese
culture and Confucian values, and thus be resinicized as ‘real’ Chinese.
Efforts to revive ‘lost’ Chinese culture take different forms in the Chinese-
language press. Newspapers and magazines publish Chinese literature,
poems, classical stories, calligraphy, students’ compositions, and information
about travel in China and about learning Mandarin in their supplementary
sections. It can be said that this effort might only be ‘personally satisfying’
for the older generation, as young Chinese-Indonesians are not able to read
this sophisticated literature. Nevertheless, the supplementary section has
become a very important ‘space’ in which older-generation poets and writers
can ‘socialize’. It is not uncommon to see these people contributing poems
and calligraphy in classical Mandarin to pay each other a compliment. Some
of their poems and articles reflect their continuous feeling of ambivalence
at living in Indonesia, especially the literature written by those affected by
the May 1998 riots.
Sometimes the promotion of Chinese language and culture turns out to
be an imposition of ‘Chineseness’ by those who see themselves as more
‘authentic’ than those who have lost most of their Chinese culture. This is
illustrated in a debate on the term mu yu (mother tongue) and guo yu (national
language) that took place in Media Aspirations.27 In a particular issue, a
contributor defined ‘ethnicity’ as represented by one’s blood and race. Hence,
he argued that Mandarin should be the ‘mother tongue’ of all Chinese who
have Chinese blood. He acknowledged that many Chinese-Indonesians 
have lost their ability to speak their ‘mother tongue’, but argued that this is
only a ‘short-term’ phenomenon, created by the New Order government.
Following on from that, he urged the Chinese community to take up the
responsibility of promoting Chinese language. He also asserted that, with
the new policy of multiculturalism, Mandarin should be given the same rights
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as other ethnic languages in Indonesia such as Javanese and Sundanese. He
accepted Bahasa Indonesia as the national language of Chinese-Indonesians
but not as their first language, which, he reiterated, is Mandarin (Media
Aspirations 2004, Issue 59, pp. 13–15).
The above argument attempted to define ‘mother tongue’ unequivocally
on the basis of an essentialist concept of ethnicity that stresses ‘once a
Chinese, always a Chinese’ and abusively uses multiculturalism to justify
its claim for ethnic solidarity and rights. The hegemonic identification of
Chinese ‘race’ and Chinese language unrealistically assumed that Chinese-
Indonesian identity is fixed and unchanging and denied the day-to-day
hybridization and transformation of their identity through interaction with
local cultures.28
Conclusion
Looking at the Chinese press in post-Suharto Indonesia, we see both change
and continuity. Nostalgia for the past is a feature of the post-Suharto Chinese
press. Even though the contemporary Chinese press is not as politically orien-
tated as the pre-1966 Chinese press, it strongly perceives the promotion of
Chinese culture and resinicization of Chinese-Indonesians as its primary
objective. It is apparent that the Indonesian-language and Chinese-language
Chinese presses are equally serious in their commitment to the so-called
cultural ‘mission’. The older generation’s insistence on imposing their
‘Chineseness’ on the younger generation very much reflects their concept
of identity. Many older-generation Chinese-Indonesians are apologetic about
the younger generation who no longer speak Chinese. They tend to equate
Chinese values with the ability to speak Chinese languages and thus perceive
people who do not speak Chinese as deprived of Chinese values.
However, Nonini and Ong remind us that:
‘Chineseness’ is no longer . . . a property or essence of a person calcu-
lated by that person’s having more or fewer ‘Chinese values’ or norms,
but instead can be understood only in terms of the multiplicity of ways
in which ‘being Chinese’ is an inscribed relation of persons and 
groups to forces and processes associated with global capitalism and 
its modernities.
(1997: 3–4)
This ‘multiplicity’ of ‘Chineseness’ has become a reality of Chinese-
Indonesians’ lives in their day-to-day negotiation with the non-Chinese
majority and the forces of globalization. Unfortunately, the multiple and
hybrid identities of Chinese-Indonesians are not acknowledged by some 
of the post-Suharto Chinese presses, which (re)presented and continue to
(re)present ‘Chineseness’ in essentialist terms as argued in this chapter. They
tend to see the rise of China as a perfect opportunity for them to attract
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young people to identify with their cultural roots – the identity that they
were born with – whether this incentive is working or not. In this way, the
older generations deploy an essentialist position of being Chinese through
an attempt to reconnect with China.
This chapter has clearly demonstrated the heterogeneity and diversity of
the Chinese press in post-Suharto Indonesia. In fact, as the Chinese press 
is continuously negotiating between the global and the local, politics 
and culture, and Chinese and Indonesian identities, so are the Chinese-
Indonesians themselves. Faced with the diverse information (re)presented in
the press, it can be said that the dilemma of Chinese-Indonesian readers
would resonate with that of Sun’s, that is, it ‘is not whether I can continue
to be Chinese. . .; it is how Chinese or what kind of Chinese I want to be’
(see Introduction in this volume).
Notes
1 This research was undertaken as part of my doctoral studies at the University
of Western Australia (UWA). The material from this chapter was gathered during
my field research in Jakarta in 2004, under the auspices of the Indonesia Institute
of Sciences (LIPI), the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta,
an Australian Postgraduate Award, a Dean’s Postgraduate Travel Award from
UWA and Postgraduate Fieldwork Funds from the School of Social and Cultural
Studies at UWA.
The author would like to express appreciation to Dr Lyn Parker at UWA and
Ms January Lim at the University of Alberta for their generous comments and
advice on my earlier draft. Special thanks to Wanning Sun for her critical reading
and relentless effort in editing my chapter.
2 For a detailed study of the Chinese terms huaqiao and huaren, see Wang (1976a:
118–27; 1976b: 249–60).
3 The identification of the totok-peranakan distinction based on birthplace and
race (pure or mixed blood) is noted in Somers (1964) and Williams (1960).
4 Amyot (1972) also notes that the ‘peranakan society distinguishes itself from
Indonesian society by what it has retained of Chinese culture. This retention is
due partly to the character of Chinese culture itself that is hardy and singularly
persistent even under the most adverse conditions’ (p. 73). Williams (1960) notes
that the Chinese felt themselves culturally superior to other peoples. ‘The term
“culturalism” has come into limited use to describe the attitude of the Chinese
in their pre-nationalist relationship with foreigners’ (p. 15). Williams claims that
this attitude made them extremely reluctant to accept or to acknowledge having
accepted innovations from abroad. Thus, the Chinese belief in the supremacy of
their civilization was possibly the chief barrier to social communication with
Indonesians.
5 The Chinese-Malay (Bahasa Melayu Tionghoa) language they speak is also
known as Batavian Malay. This language is a combination of bazaar Malay and
the Hokkien dialect, and was later enriched by borrowings from Dutch and other
Western languages. See Oetomo (1988) and Suryadinata (1981: xiv).
6 The stance against using the totok and peranakan distinction is contrary to
Suryadinata’s (2004a) paper on ethnic Chinese literature in Indonesia, 
where he still uses this dichotomy to describe post-Suharto Chinese-Indonesian
literature. Suryadinata’s insistence on using the traditional binary implies an
assumption of identity as static, inflexible, singular, essentialist and unchanging.
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Suryadinata’s simplistic understanding of identity has undermined the complexity
of Chinese identity in contemporary Indonesia. The dichotomy between totok
and peranakan needs to be deconstructed rather than perpetuated.
7 Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan was established to reform the ‘corrupt’ Chinese customs
practised by the peranakan, to promote Confucianism and to provide Chinese
education with a modern curriculum (see Kwee 1969).
8 The leftist newspapers accused the Guomindang of being the running dog of the
United States and blamed them for almost giving China away to the imperial-
ists. Meanwhile, the rightist newspapers accused the Communist Party of China
of trying to sell China to the USSR and propagated support for Chiang Kai Shek
to invade mainland China (Li, Z. H. 2003: 19).
9 For instance, Zhengzhi Xuanyan Bao (Harian Manipol), whichwas established
in Medan in 1961, only lasted for five months. Another daily that appeared in
Surabaya, called Hong Bai Bao, was also banned in 1962 (see Suryadinata 1978:
139–40).
10 According to Krishna Sen and David Hill (2000: 52), ‘[d]uring the early years
of independence the press was dubbed by President Sukarno a “tool of the
Revolution”, responsible for energising and mobilising public opinion. Political
parties became sponsors of the medium’. This phenomenon could also be seen
in Warta Bakti, which propagated Sukarno’s political thoughts and supported
the integration ethnic policy of Baperki (Indonesian Citizens Consultative 
Body) – a powerful left-wing Chinese social-political organization formed in
1954 and aimed at protecting Chinese who were Indonesian citizens (see Li, Z.
H. 2003: 45–6).
11 Suryadinata (2004c: vii) refers to Chinese organizations, Chinese schools and
Chinese media as the ‘three pillars’ of Chinese culture. Chinese-Indonesian
writers tend to refer to these as the ‘three treasures’ (san bao) of Chineseness.
12 Zhuo Hui Li (2003: 323) described the experience of the Chinese press in the
post-Suharto era as being able to ‘see clear sky again’ (cong jian tian ri). Another
writer described it as being able to ‘see light again’ (cong jian guang ming) 
(see Xing 2004: 14).
13 The front page of The International Chinese Newsweekly (Yazhou Zhoukan) is
entitled ‘Lifting the ban on Chinese Culture in Indonesia: Jakarta welcomes the
second springtime for Chinese’. See The International Chinese Newsweekly
(Yazhou Zhoukan) (12–18 March 2001, pp. 28–31).
14 This information was given to me in an interview with a Chinese-Indonesian
media observer and activist in Jakarta.
15 The term ‘Chinese’ is in quotation marks because the lunar calendar that is
published in Sinar Glodok is more accurately described as a ‘Chinese-Indonesian’
calendar because it represents a unique Chinese-Indonesian culture. First, the
language the calendar uses is Hokkien rather than Mandarin. Second, the year
2555 is based on Confucius’ birthday rather than the real lunar year. To the best
of the author’s knowledge, no Chinese calendar uses Confucius’ birth year as
the first lunar year.
16 This construction of ‘Chineseness’ in popular stereotypes (such as hardworking
and successful in business) implicitly demonized and essentialized the indige-
nous Indonesians or pribumi as ‘lazy natives’.
17 I gathered from my interviews with some older-generation, Chinese-educated
Chinese-Indonesians that they think that later generations, who did not have a
chance to receive a Chinese education, do not have Chinese values and should
be resinicized. They tend to equate Chinese education with Chinese values. That
means people who cannot speak Chinese are deprived of Chinese values.
18 Susy Susanti is a national badminton player who represented Indonesia and 
won a gold medal in the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona. Kwik Gian Gie is an
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economist and currently the head of BAPPENAS (Badan Perencanaan
Pembangunan Nasional or the National Development Planning Body) in
Indonesia.
19 For instance, the magazine Yinni yu Dongxie (Indonesia and ASEAN) was being
boycotted and forced to change management in 2003 because it was thought to
be pro-Taiwan. One of the reasons for this condemnation was that it once reported
news about the Falungung movement in Indonesia, which angered the Chinese
Embassy in Jakarta. Another reason was that the founder of this magazine was
educated in Taiwan. Hence, he assumed it better to be pro-Taiwan, even though
he claimed that he had never supported Taiwan’s independence from China. He
referred to his educational background as the ‘original sin’ (yuan zui), a stigma
that cannot be erased (Interview, 5 July 2004).
20 Another Chinese magazine, Yinhua Zhisheng (The Voice of the Indonesian
Chinese Magazine), has also been perceived by the Chinese community in Jakarta
as a pro-Taiwan magazine simply because it was established by Chinese-
Indonesian alumni who were educated in Taiwan and focuses on news and
political commentaries on Taiwan and China–Taiwan relations. However, the
chief editor stressed that this magazine is anti-Taiwan’s independence. It covers
Taiwan and China news because of the demand of its readers. Its readership is
made up of Taiwanese business people and Chinese-Indonesians who are
concerned about China–Taiwan relations. This further challenges the simplistic
pro-China or pro-Taiwan dichotomy that has been a popular identity marker in
the Chinese-speaking community in Indonesia.
21 The New Indonesia and ASEAN (Issue 3) published a story about a Chinese-
American who became the first Asian chancellor of a state university in America.
In Issue 5, it published the story of Ryan Cheung, an American of Chinese
descent who obtained his undergraduate degree at the age of 16 and became one
of the youngest graduates in Los Angeles. Issue 6 of the same magazine reported
the story of Kevin Yang, another American of Chinese descent who achieved
the highest score in the Math Plus competition in the whole of the United States.
The tabloid The Capital Weekly dedicates its first two pages to reports on ‘huashe
jingying’. For instance, the thirteenth edition of this tabloid reported the story
of Kuang Jieling, a fourth-generation Chinese-American who entered politics
and struggled for the rights of ethnic minorities.
22 Political education is perceived to be much needed by the older-generation
Chinese-speaking community who avoided politics for more than three decades.
To promote political awareness, the chief editor of The International Daily, Li
Zhuo Hui, has published three books in Chinese on Indonesian politics and the
history of Chinese-Indonesians: Yinhua xianqu renwu guanghui suiyue (The Role
of the Chinese in Indonesia’s Struggle for Independence) (2003), Yingjie luodi
shenggen shidai (The History of Chinese Education in Indonesia) (2003) and
Minzhu gaige shidai zhengzhi fengyun (Political Development in the Democratic
and Reformasi Era) (2004). Similarly, the chief editor of The Voice of Indonesian
Chinese Magazine, Sunardi Mulia, also published three books about Indonesian
politics and economy in Chinese: Gaigezhong de Yinni (Indonesia in the
Reformasi Era) (2000), Fengyuzhong de Yinni (Indonesia in Recession) (2002)
and Zhuanbianzhong de Yinni (Indonesia in Transition) (2002).
23 For instance, in 2004, the chief editor of The International Daily was 66 years
old; the chief editor of The Voice of Indonesian Chinese Magazine was 55 years
old; the founder and adviser of Xin Yindong was 72 years old; and the director
of Qiandao Ribao was 70 years old. All four of them acknowledge that most
of their staff are at least 50 years of age (Interviews, various dates).
24 The problem of lacking skilled reporters in Chinese languages is manifested in
Kun Dian Ri Bao (Pontianak Daily), which was established on 26 July 2001.
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Its publisher had to send their staff to Sarawak, to Kuching’s Sin Chew Jit Poh
(a Malaysian Chinese press) for training and ‘borrow’ Sin Chew’s staff
temporarily in Pontianak to ‘help out’ (reported in Pantau-Kajian dan
Jurnalisme, Year II, No. 016, August 2001. Online. Available www.pantau.or.id/
txt/16/02/html).
25 This construction of ‘Chineseness’ has implications for the pribumi identity (see
note 16).
26 The director of The Archipelago Daily told me that he does not see The
International Daily as his rival because they are working towards the same cause
of promoting Chinese culture.
27 The debate about whether Mandarin should be considered as the ‘mu yu’ of
Chinese-Indonesians started with a short article contributed by a reader criti-
cizing an article in The International Daily (17 October 2003), which mentioned
that ‘hanyu (Mandarin) is not our mu yu (mother tongue)’. The contributor
defined ‘mu yu’ as a language spoken by an ethnic group and insisted that
Mandarin is the mother tongue of all ethnic Chinese, including those in Indonesia
(Media Aspirations 2003, Issue 57, p. 28). In the next issue, another contributor
questioned, ‘How could Mandarin be a foreign language and not the mother
tongue of ethnic Chinese?’ (Media Aspirations 2004, Issue 58, p. 23). Media
Aspirations also published articles from Lianhe Zaobao, a Chinese newspaper
published in Singapore, which stress that Mandarin is the mother tongue of the
ethnic Chinese. The popular ‘Speak Mandarin Campaign’, and other official
policies, to inculcate the Chinese people with Chinese culture have been critiqued
by Ang (2001) as counter-effects of hybridization.
28 Ian Ang, in her book On Not Speaking Chinese (2001), precisely challenges such
essentialist representation and points out the urgent need to deconstruct
‘Chineseness’. I have argued elsewhere that ‘[e]thnic identity is not based 
upon intrinsic characteristics such as race, blood, tradition and ancestry but varies
from generation to generation and is shaped by local circumstances’ (Hoon
2004a: 14).
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